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•

· ·Introductio n
Recently there is a well-intent ioned concern, on the part of the
academician s

1)

.

.

and practioners alike

2)

·

, that in the development process

of a contemporar y 1ess developed countries, there may be a conflict
between growth and FID-equity {i.e. family income distributio n equity).
A "conflict thesis" is, of course, not new.

For historicall y, when

the Western countries (e.g. England) went into the ''modern growth
·

epoch"

3)

· 4)

, radical writers of the 19th century (e.g. Karl Marx)

had

already made a similar but more vehement protest against the unequal
accumulatio n of capital wealth to the extent that families are stratified
class CH and a capital-les s
into a capital-own ing (bourgeois)
~
L
,
extreme
an
stresses
(proletarian ) class C. This "class orientation "
and stylized form of inequality of capital ownership.

This paper aims

to approach the "conflict thesis"-- i.e. growth with or without equity
analyticall y.

• I

Any analytical framework of a "conflict thesis" will have to
incoporate "macro" as well as "micro" economic variables.

For "macro"

variables, the' '"class-orie ntation" necessitate s the postulation of
labor (1) and capital (k) that receives, respectivel y, wage income (w)
and property income {ir=rk) where r is the '"rate of r.A.t11rn to capital".
The national income z, with two values added components, (i.e. z-=w+rk)
in turn leads to savings (s) and consumption (c) (i.e. z=c+s).

In a

dynamic context, s leads to a larger capital stock k' in the next
period {k'=s+k) the rapidity of accumulatio n is described by the rate of
growth of capital (nk=s/k).

Any respectable "conflict thesis" almost

certainly will have to deal with these macro variables.

. ·····

-fWhen there are n familie s, every one of the macro variabl es x
introduc ed above {in a lower case letter) , can be disaggr egated into
·,

a pattern {i.e. a vector, indicate d by a correspo nding upper case letter)

X=(Xl'x2 , ••• Xn) in the sense that x-x1+x2+ ••• Xn.

Thus Z=W+-rK

= s+c

In particu lar K=(K 1,K2' •••Kn) (K'=(Ki ,Ki, .. .K~)) is the
capital- ownersh ip pattern of this{the next) period while S==(s 1 ,s 2 , •• Sn)

and K'=K+S.

is the family saving pattern .

If I(•) is an index of inequal ity (e.g.

-a Gini coeffic ient), the inequal ity of family saving I{S) seems to be

a root cause of the differen ce between I{K) and I(K') (i.e. the changes
of the inequal ity of capital ownersh ip through time).

The conflic t

thesis in this paper involve s the "macro" capital gro~th rate 'lk as

well as the inequal ities of the pattern s of the micro variabl es.
The above suggest s a number of models of inequal ity analysi s.
5
For example , the so called "factor component approac h'' to FID analysi s )
is.based on Z=W+rK where the wage income pattern W=(W1 ,w2 , •••• Wn)
and the property income pattern 1Frk={rK1 ,rKi,···r Kn) are two factor
6
co~one nts of the FID pattern Z={Z 1 ,z 2 , ••• ,Zn). It is well known )
that I(rK)=I( K) (i.e. the inequal ity of the property income ~=rK or
the capital ownersh ip pattern K) is more unequal ly distribu ted than Z.. and
hence constitu te a primary cause of the inequal ity of Z (i.e. I(K)>I( Z)).
Similar ly, based on Z=S+c, we shall show that the family saving pattern
is usually more unequal ly distribu ted than Z (i.e. I(S)>I( Z)).

Thus,

in any year, unequal capital ownersh ip is the "cause" of FID inequal ity
while an unequal ly distribu ted saving pattern Sis the consequ ence.
However, a very unequal ly distribu ted savings pattern Swill in
turn worsen the capital ownersh ip pattern (I(K')>I (K)) over time leading
to an "inequi table orienta tion".

We shall prove that this will occur

. -3-

H
when families in the capital owning class C have a higher "capital-

aensitive7) average propensity to save" than families in CL.

Further

aore, the "inequitabl e orientation " occurs at a pace proportiona l to
the capital growth rate{'\_) for the whole economy., Thus the more

rapidly the economy grows (i.e. large

flit)

the faster the "equality of

capital ownership" deteriorate s which, in essence, quantifies the
"confliet thesis".
Conscientio usness of growth with wealth concentrati on has led to
policy recommenda tions that includes revolution, fulfillment of basic needs~)
progressive income tax system.

and

Let Z=(Z

1

,z2 , ••• Zn)

(X=(X

1

,x2 , ••Xn))

be the income pattern for n-families before (after) tax that are related
by an income tax· schedule t(z) (i.e.

x1=z1 -t(Z1 )). We shall show that

a model of income tax has precisely the same abstract (mathematic al)
properties of the other models (i.e. models based on Z=W+rK=S+c) mentioned
earlier.

Thus a theorem which we shall prove for the income tax model

(i.e. one that characteriz es the progressive income tax system) can be
used for the.analysi s of the "conflict thesis".
The difficulty of "inequa•lity analysis" is largely due to the
complexitie s in the manipulatio ns of "degrees of inequalitie s".

In

section 1, we shall build the tools of analysis by introducing the
abstract notion of a "conjugate pairs of transformat ion functions".
Properties of these transformat ion functions will be defined in section

2 where "abstract" theorems will be proved.

These theorems will be

applied to the income tax problem and the other growth related problems
in sections 3 and 4.
final sect ion.

The "conflict thesis" will be presented in the

-4Section 1 Inequality Under Transformation
Let R be the n-dimentional real space R={ZIZ=(Z ,z , ••• Zn)L
1

A point
2
ZfR is, abstractly, an economic pattern (e.g. a FID pattern) of n families.
Let T(Z) be a mapping of R into R.

Suppose a real valued function t(z)

is given we can construct a special type of mapping (i.e. an "indexable"

mapping), according to the following definition:
Definition:

A mapping T(Z) of R into R is indexable by the transformation

function t(z) if for any z,R, X=(X

1

,x2 , ••• Xn)=T(Z)={t(Z 1),

t(Z ), ••• t(Zn)).
2

Let/1 be the set of all indexable mappings and let ::;- be the set of
all real-valued functions t(z).
between

There is a one to one correspondence

x and 'f. We shall use a lower case letter (e.g. w(z)) to denote

a member off and an upper case letter (e.g. W(Z)) to denote the correspond

ing mapping.
Definition:

We have the following definition:
The conjugate mapping of any T(Z)~)'\ is T*(Z) with a
transformation function t*(z)=z-t(z)

It is obvi~us that the pair T(Z) and T*(Z) are conjugate mappings
of each other (i.e. T**(Z)=T(Z)) in view of the symmetry
(1.1)

t*(z)

+ t(z) = z

Thus If is partitioned into distinct conjugating pairs T(Z) and T*(Z)
with a self-conjugating member t(z)=t*(z)=.Sz.
As a diagramatic aid, the transformation function t(z) is represented

by a transformation curve in diagram 1.

A point ZfR, represented on the

horizontal axis, is transformed ~to X=T(Z)=(X
•

·. I

axis.

1

,x2 , •••Xn)

on the vertical

The conjugate transformation function t*(z) is represented by

-st

R-
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X

n
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the curve in the lower deck and reflects the vertical gaps(i.e. aibi)
between t(z) and the 45

0

line OR in the upper deck.

Let us denote the mean value of any WfR by
Definitio n:

W.

For any ZtR, the average ratio of X=T(Z) is

In diagram 1, f

X

~

X

=X/Z

is the slope of the radial line OA passing through
-

Thus when a mapping T(Z),x is given, we have

the mean point m=(X,Z).

a triplet of patterns X={X1 ,x2 , •••Xn)=T(Z) and X*=(Xt,X~, •••X~)=T*(Z)

for any ZfR defining a pair of average ratios ('x' 'x*):

f =X/Z=T(Z)/Z

(1.2) a)

X

and

f

=X*/Z=T*(Z)/Z

x*

satisfyin g

because

b)

Z=X+X~

c)

by (1.1)

For any real valued function t(z)E- "f , a quadruple t of functions
Q{t(z))={ {t(z) ,t*(z)), (T(Z) ,T*{Z))) is defined.

In economic applicati ons,

a triplet of variables (z,x,x*) can form a determin istic "two-equ ation
model"

M=[z=x+x *,x=t(z)] where z=x+x* is an "accounti ng equation" and

x=t(z) is a ''behavior equation" when z is treated as an exogenous

variable.

The behavior equation x=t(z) automati cally induces the qua

druplets Q(t(z)).

All the basic concepts of the section can be

summarized in the following definitio n.
Definitio n: . The behavior equation t(z) of a two-equa tion model
M=[z=x+x *,x=t(z)J induces the quadrupl ets:
(1.3)a)

Q(t(z))= ((t(z),t*( Z)), (T(Z),T-k(Z))

where t*(z)(T*( Z)) is the conjugate function(m apping) of
Any Z=(z 1,z 2~-~-Zn)tR induces a pair of
patterns: X=(X1 ,x2 , •••Xn)•T(Z) and X*=(Xt,X~, ••••x:)=T *(Z)
t(z) (T(Z)).

satisfyin g

-7-

for which a triplet of mean values

(Z,X,X*)

determine

two average ratios
and

c)

satisfying (1.2b,c).

If I(•) is any reasonable index of

inequality, a triplet of Eattern inequalities

d)

I(Z), I(X), I(X*)
can be defined when

Z ;:_ 0, X ;:_ 0,

and X* > 0

As an illustration, let the triplet of economic variables be income
before tax(z), after tax (x*) and tax payment (x) of a typical family
that satisfies the accounting equaiton z=x+x* in the two-equation model

M-=[z-x+x*, t (z)J." where the behavior equation t (z) is the· income tax
· schedule.

When a FID pattern Z is given exogeneously, X and X* in 1.3b

are. respectively, the tax burden pattern and the disposable income

pattern of n families.

The triplet

(Z.X,X*)

stand for average national

income, tax payment and disposable income "per family" and hence ~x (~x*)
in (1.3c) stand for the average tax rate (average disposable income rate)
I(Z)~I(X) and I(X*) in (1.3d) stand for the
degree of inequality of Z, X and X* respectively.

This model of income

tax system will be studied in section 3 below where the progressiveness
of the tax schedule t(z) will be defined (See introduction).
As another example, let the triplet of economic variables be income

(z), consumption (c) and saving (s) of families that satisfy the accounting
equation z=s+c in the two-equation model:
(1.4)

where the behavior equation s(z) is the "family saving function"
and c•s*(z)•z-s(z) is the family consumption function.

When an FID

-8-

pattern Z~R is given exogeneo usly, the triplet

(Z,S,O-S*)

stand for

-s/z

per capita income {Z), saving{S) and consumpt ion{C), and hence ♦ s

(♦CsC/Z) is the a;erage propensit y to save {consume). of Keynes ..

The

triplet of I{Z), I{C) and l{S) stand for the inequalit y of income,

'
respectiv ely ..
consumpti on and saving

This model M will be used in
s

the analysis of saving inequalit y in section 4 (see introduc tion).

In this paper, any index of inequalit y I(•) belonging to the Balton
9
Family ) will be referred to as a reasonabl e index,

Using L{U) ~L(V)

to mean "U Lorenze Dominates V", it is well known:lO)

(1.5)

I {U)

<i

I {V) for

any reasonabl e I ( •)

•

if L(U) ~ L(V)

--9-

Reasonable Properties·for T(Z)

Section 2

In this section a number of reasonable properties for T(Z) or t(z)
will be introduced by interpreting t(z) as the income tax schedule.
Ve may wish to restrict the domain of mapping to

.

n-{ Z

IZ .::_

0}( R. the

0

nonnegative orthant of R; or ton -{ZIZ 1<z 2 ••• <Zn}cR the rank preserving
subset of R. For any FID pattern z. we can always reorder the family
so that

Zfn°.

O O

A

n=n /\ n c n c.

The intersection of

n and n°

will be denoted by
.

.

.

R which is the nonnegative rank preserving subset of

0

n•

Referring to diagram l, the income tax schedule s~ould be nonnegative
and.lie below the 450_line OR.
Defin.ition:

This motivates the following definition:

The mapping T(Z) defined on n as domain is
At)· ·uon~negative:

· A2)

non-exhaustive:

AJ) · · regular:

for all z~n

if X=T(Z)fn

if Xi= T*(Z)( n

for all ZE-n

if it is non-negative and non-exhaustive

The regularity of T(Z) ensures that the triplet of inequalities in
(1.3d)

(I(Z),I(X),I(X*)) can all be defined unambigiously.

In diagram 1 the slope of the income tax schedule t(z) is the
marginal tax rate dt/dz which ordinarily satisfies the following in
equalities O<dt/dz2.l, to ensure that t(z) and t*(z) are increasing
functions of z.
Definition:

This motivates the following definitions:

The mapping T(Z) defined on
if

n°

as domain is

X=T(Z)fnO

for all

z~nO

Bl)

non-decreasing:

B2)

(marginally) inexcessive: if X~T*(Z)~n

BJ)

rank preserving: if it is non-decreasing and inexcessive

0

for all Zf-n°

Notice that when T(Z) is rank preserving, the ranks of the families
in Z is preserved in both X and X* (i.e. they are perfectly rank correlated).

Noti ce that the above prop ertie s (Al, A2,B l,B2
) are defi ned in term s
of a tran sfor mat ion func tion T(Z) "gen erat ed"
by a real valu ed func tion
t(z) . Thes e prop ertie s can be.d efin ed,
in term s of t(z) , equ ival entl y
as stat ed in the follo wing lemma:
Lemma 1:

In term s of dz) , the prop ertie s Al,A 2,Bl ,B2
can be defi ned
equi vale ntly as follo ws:

(2.1 ) a)

Al) ·non -neg ativ e

b)

A2)· ·non -exh aust ive

c)

Bl) ·non .:.de crea sing

d)

B2)· ·ine xces sive

t(z) > 0
t(z)

~

t(za )

for all z > 0

z for all z > 0
~

t(zb )

for all z < zb
at(za )-t"{ ~)<z -~ for all z~z
b
-a

Proo f:

To show (2.ld ) is equi vale nt to B2, supp ose
B2 is vali d.
.
.
0
Let z~z b. Con stru ct U=( za,z b,·• ·•2b )fn.
Thus T*(U )={t *(za ),t*( zb), ••
0
.
.
t*(z b))t n by B2 and t*(z a)=z a-t(
za)~ t*{~ )=zb -t(z b). This imp lies
t(zb )-t( z )<zb -z which prov es (2.l d). Con vers
ely supp ose (2.l d) is
a a
vali d, z~n0.

Let i<j then_ Z <Zj. t{Zj )-t(Z i)~Z j-Zi by
(2.l d). Then
1
.
0
Xt=t *{Zi )=Z -t{Z )~Zj -t{Z j)=t* (Zj) =Xj whic
h prov es X*Hl • Thus (2. ld)
1
1
and B2 are equ ival ent. The proo fs of the othe
r equi vale nces are
sim ilar .

Q.E.D.

From diag ram 1 we see that the aver age tax
rate s indi cate d by
the slop es of oa , oa , •••0 a form an incr easi
ng (dec reas ing) sequ ence
1
2
0
if the income tax syste m is "pro gres sive "
{reg ress ive) . This mot ivat es
the follo wing defi niti on in which 0/0 is defi
ned to be zero :
Def initi on:

A mapping T{Z) defi ned on n as domain is
Cl)

aver age incr easi ng:

C2)_ aver age decr easi ng:

if O<z <zb imp lies t(za )/za < t{7, )/zb
8
if O<za<zb imp lies t(za )/za > t(21 ,)/zb

We readily have the following theorem:
The pairs (Al,A2),(Bl,B2 ).(Cl,C2) are anti-symmetric alll)

Theorem 1:

pairs of properites for the conjugating pairs of>-(, hence
a)

T(Z) is regular if and only if T*(Z) is regular

b)

T(Z) is rank preserving if and only if T*(Z) is rank

preserving
c) ·T(Z) is average increasing (decreasing) if and only if
· •Tfl(Z) · is

average decreasing (increasing).

The proofs are elementary and are omitted.

For example the anti

symmetry of (Cl,C2) follows readily from
t*(z)/z + ~{z)/z - 1

(2.2)

by (1.1)

Notice that Al (A2) states that T(Z) (T*(Z)) is endomorphic in A
0

while Bl (B2) states that T(Z) (T*(Z)) is endomorphic inn. Since
0
n is a subset of n and n, the above definitions are applicable when
A

A

We have the following lemmas:

the domain of T(Z) is restricted ton.
A

Lemma 2:

a)

T(Z) is endomorphic on n if Al and Bl are satisfied~
,.

b)· ·T•{z)•is endomorphic on

n if A2 and B2 are·satisfied

(Proof: omitted)
. Lemma 3:

a)

T(Z) defined on n as domain satisfies Bl if it satisfies
Al and Cl.

b)

T(Z) defined on n as domain satisfies B2'if it Satisfies
A2 and C2.

(Proof:

<zb then t(z a )/za < t(z.o )/zb by (Cl).
To prove (a), if O<z
- a

And hence t(zb)>t{z a )•zb/za >t(za )>O
-

by Al

and zb/z >l.
a

This proves (a).

To prove {b) we see T*(Z) satisfy (Al) and

(Cl) and hence (Bl) by (a).

Hence T(Z) satisfies (B2).

Q.E.D.)

Notice that all the properties which we have introduced are the
most "ordinary" and hence the most "useful" in the analysis of
inequalitie s.

Section 3

Analysis of·Income·Tax·system

For the income tax problem of section 1, we begin by interpreting
(2.1 abed) as four "axioms" for an income tax schedule ·t-{z).

Al rul,es out subsidy {negative tax).

A2 is an "ability to pay" axiom.

Bl illlplies higher income families pay no less taxes.
"\

.

"\

Thus

B2 is an "axiom

.

of incentive preservation" which implies that the disposable income
wi11 nQt decrease when income before tax increases.

Without it,

·.

\.

faudlies will obviously not have the incentive to earn a higher income.
It is easy to show· {A_l,A2,Bl.B2) forms an "axiomatic system" {i.e. they
are consi"stent and· ind·ependent).

A popu1ar equity oriental property of a tax schedule is its
"\

"progressiveness" accord·ing to the following definition:_
Definition:

A tax schedule t{z) is·progressive if T{Z) is·average
· · iilcre;asing {Cl)

For a progressive tax schedule, the .average tax rate increases
,.

when family income increases.
tax burden pattern

Given t"{z) and an FID pattern ZH2, a

X=T{Z) and a disposable income pattern X:k:T*(Z)

are induced (see 1.3b).

We have the following theorem:

a)··nort~rtegative (Al). and progressive (Cl) if and only if

b) · ·nort~exhaustive (A2) ~ ;inexcessive {B2) ·and· progressive(Cl)

· ·1f·and"6nly if

L(Z)

· · f ot ·au· non~urtiform z. ~- n

(Proof:

see below)

•

~

L(T*(Z))

-.14-

Notice that lemma 3a implies Bl is satisfied for the tax schedule
t(z) in theorem 2a and hence L(T(Z)) can be unambiguously defined

,..

because T(Z)E-Jl. by lemma 2a.

Theorem I implies that the disposable

income schedule t*(z) for t(z) in theorem 2b is average decreasing (C2)
and lemma 2b implies L(T*(Z)) can defined unambiguously.

The non

uniformity of Z (i.e. Z has at least two distinct components) is
essential for otherwise the theorem is false (i.e. L(Z)=L(T(Z))=L(T*(Z)).
Theorem 2 will be proved later.
Since a reasonable tax schedule t(z) should satisfy

all "axioms"

in 2.1, we can define a progressive income tax "system" as follows:
Definition:

An income tax·system is progressive if the tax schedule

t·(z) is progressive (Cl), non-negative (Al), non-exhaustive

(A2) and inexcessive {B2).
Notice that a progressive tax system also satisfies Bl (by lemma
3a).

We have

Corollary I

For a·progressive income tax·system
a) · · :t·(z) ·and· t* (z) are regular· and rank· preserving
b) · ·f*.(z) ·is· average decreasing· (C2) while· t"(z.) · is

· ·average·increasing (Cl)
(Proof:

implied by theorem I)

The following characterization of a progressive income tax system
is·a direct corollary of theorem 2.

Corollary 2 ·A continuous tax schedule constitutes a progressive
· ·1ncome·tax system if and only if for a11·non~uniform Zfn,
. .L(T{Z))

.f

L(Z) ~ L(T*(Z))

•

Thus when a legislatu re intends to design an "equity oriented"
income tax system (in the sense of L(Z) ~ L(T*(Z)) for every ZH2 ) ,
the tax system must be a progressi ve one.

Corollary 2 implies the

fol~owing corollary by (1.5):
Corollary 3 ·For a progressi ve income tax system,

I(T*(Z)) < I(Z) < I(T(Z))
·for any reasonabl e index of inequali ty·!(•).
Thus we see, for any progressi ve income tax system, I(Z) is
always straddled by I(T*(Z)) and I(T(Z)) as the degree of inequalit y
of the disposabl e income pattern I(T*(Z)) (tax burden pattern I(T(Z)))
is always lower (higher) than I(Z).

We need the following lellDila to prove theorem 2:

(3.1) a)

X, X'H2

b)

c)

tQere exists an integer k, l<k<n

.x~~ for a11· i<k
X >X 1

i

1

such that

and

for all i>k

then
(3.2)

L{X 1 ) ::_ L(X)
(Proof:

See appendix)

The proof of the necessary condition of theorem 2a will be outlined
with the aid of diagram 1.

When a non-unifo rm Zfn

For the average ratio~X=X/Z,. we assert:

•

is given, let X=T(Z).

(3.3)

•

X

> 0

(Proof:

Z > 0 because Z is non-uniform, X > 0 because T(Z) is

non-negative.

If

X=O

then x =0 for

i•l,2, ••• n

1

This contradicts the non-uniformity of Z when t(z) is
average increasing.

Q.E.D.)

Let a pattern xr:::(Xr ,x', .••• X') be constructed in (3.4a) with
i 2
n
properties shown in (3.4bc):
(3.4) a)

xr=•X Z

b)

Xj+Xi+- ••+X~=X1+X2+- ••+xn

c)

L(X' )=L{Z)

(Proof:

{b) follows from

and

(c) follows from (a)

Q.E.D.)

In diagram one the points (X1,zi)

i=l,2,.~.n fall on the radial

line OA with an equation

x=•X z

(3.5)

OA has a strictly positive slope and passes through the mean point
m=(x, Y).
(3.6)

By (3.4c),

it is sufficient to prove:

L(X') ~ L(X)

with the aid of lemma 4.

(3.lb) ·is satisfied by (3.4b).
A

Notice that (3.la) is satisfied

by (3.4a)

Thus it is sufficient to prove (3.lc).

diagrammatical argument is OA intersects t(z) from above when t(z) is

average increasing.

The details will be supplied in the appendix where

all other parts of theorem 2 will also be proved.
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Section 4 Cause and Consequence of FID Inequality
The inequality of property income or capital ownershi~ is a major
cause of FID inequality while the inequality of saving is the con
sequence {see introduction).

In this section, two separate models

with the form defined in {1.3) will be used to analyze these causual
relations.
The first model is M •Iz-s+c>s{z)] defined in (1.4).
s

It should

not be a surprise that the mathematical properties {Al,A2,Cl and B2)
which we have postulated for a progressive income tax EQ'Stem are
entirely appropriate for the ..saving function s{z)".

In particular,

B2 implies that the consumption function s*{z) is an increasing function
of family income (z-) and Cl implies "increasing average propensity to
save" reminicent of the·well known "Keynesian" property at the "family"
level.

All theorems in the last section are applicable.

Thus

corollary 3 can be rephrased as:
·corollary 3* ·For·a saving function satisfying·(Al,A2,B2) and increasing
··avetage·ptopensity save (Cl)

then

· ·for·any reasonable index of inequality I(•) and for

.

· · any·non-uniform income pattern·z,n
Thus we see, while "increasing average propensity to save" has
unemployment implications in the multiplier analysis of macro-economics,
it leads to an equalization of current consumption welfare (l(Z})<l(C))

and unequal distribution of capital ownership in future due to "high"
saving inequality (I(S)>I(Z)).

For the second model, let the family income {z) be the sum of
wage {w) and property income {;r) {i.e. in 4.la below) for which an

empirical property income function is postulated {i.e. t·{z) in 4.lb):
(4.1) a)

z.=w+ ,r

b)

These equations form a "two-equati on model" lli.e .. Mf=.(z=w+rr, n=t{z)]
All concepts in (l .3a-d) are now applicable.

The "behavior" equation

,r==t{z) has been used in empirical approaches to FID inequality via the
12
so called "factor component approach" .. ) It was found that properties
· (Al,A2,B2,C l) are, again, satisfied.

For example, Al {A2) implies that

property {wage) incomes are non-negativ e.

Moreover, for families with

higher total family income, B2 implies that family wage income is higher
and Cl implies that property income share {i.e. property income as a
fraction of total family income) is higher.· Thus we can again rephrase
corollary 3: Corollary 3**

For a property income function ,r=t(z) satisfying
{Al,A2,Bl,C l), then
I{X)=I{JI1,I l2, •••• nn) > I(Z) > I(X*)=I(WPW 2, ••• Wn)

for any reasonable index of inequality and for any
non-uniform

ZfSt

This conclusion, stating that, using an arbitrary index of inequality,
property income (wage income) tends to be more (less) unequally dis
tributed than Z, is a generalizat ion of a known results when the Gini
coefficient was used(see footnote 12).
When the Gini coefficient is used, a well known theorem in the
13)
"factor component approach" ~:

(4.2)

z,

If
a}

X, X~ and:-Z=X+X* then G(Z)• ♦X G(X)+ ♦x*G(X*)

+X•X/Z

where

(the property income share)

b) ♦

{the wage income share)

x*•X*/Z

Since G(Z) is the weighted averaged of the factor Ginis, (4.2)
implies two alternative s:
(4.3)a)

G(X*)

< G(Z)

< G(X)

b)

G(X*)

> G(Z)

> G(X)

Notice that corollary 3**

or'

rules out the second alternative and

implies the following theorem:
Theorem 3
(4.4)a)
b)

For

a property income function n~t(z) satisfying (Al,A2,Bl,C l)

G(Z)= ♦

G(X)+t ~G(X*)

X

X"

(for ♦, ♦ *defined in (4.2abc))
X

X

G(X*) < G(Z) < G(X)
for all non-uniform
(Proof:

Zfn

Since T*(~) and T(Z) are non-negativ e and rank

preserving by corollary la, we have
Z=X+X* follows from (1.3b).
complete the proof.

Z,X,X* ~

...
n.

That

Thus (4.2) and corollary 3**

Q.E.D.)

This theorem, in terms of Cini coefficien t, can be used to
14)
strengthen the results in the pre~ious section.
In this section, w~ ~erive two major conclusions .

On the one hand,

corollary 3** states that the inequality of "property income" is a major
cause of FID inequality -- in the sense of the "factor component approach".
Inferential ly, the inequality of family "ownership of capital" is a root
cause of FID inequality.

On the other hand, corollary 3* implies that

family saving is more unequally distributed than income,

That this will

in turn leads to "unequal capital accumulation" in the future, is the
central theme of the next section •

•
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Section 5

Growth With Wealth Concentration

In a capitalistic society, families accumulate capital assets through
A family saving pattern S•{S 1 ,s 2 , ••• Sn) leads directly to
Let
the increase of privately held capital stocks K-={K 1 ,K2 , •••Kn).

savings.

K's(Ki,K

2,... K~)

be the family ownership pattern of capital in the

. next period, then

(5.l)a)
b)

K'-=K+S
K'

~

0,

K ~ 0,

S > 0

Let the sum of all elements in K',K.and S be denoted by B',B and J
We have the following macro magnitudes:

respectively.
(5. 2)a)
b)

H'-=H+J
1\t=J/H={H'/H)-1

In {5.2b), nk is the capital growth rate for the whole economy.
"'
~n.

Let us assume

{i.e. let the families be ranked according to the

amount of capital assets they own "this" period).
(5.3)a)
b)

and

SHl

Then {5.la) shows

implies

KEO

"'

K'Hl

Notice that condition {5.3a) means "families that own more capital
save more" and condition {5.3b) implies the family ranks of Kare

preserved in K' •
In case the Gini coefficient is used, (4.2) of the last section
leads directly to our next theorem.

In the statement of theorem 4, n~

•in (5.4b) is the rate of change of G{K), the Gini coefficient of the
capital ownership pattern and nk is the capital growth rate defined
in (5.2b).

•

Theorem 4

For K'=K+S, we have

(5.4)a)

l\;-=u(v-1)

where

b)

'\;"" (G(K' )-G(K)) /G(K)

c)

u=

d)

v= G(S)/G(K)

1\/ (1+1\)

___ _

if (5.3a) is satisfied

(Proof:
,

6

~1-,k

where

(4.2) implies G(K')=~kG(K)+~sG(S)
and

,k=H/H'=l/(1+1\) by (5.2b).

calculation leads to (5.4).

A routine

Q.E.D.)

Since realistic empirical value of nk is less than 10%, the term
u has the same order of magnitude as 1\ (e.g. u=.0099, .• 019, ••• , .056

for- nk= 1%, 2%, ." •• , 6%).

Thus (5.4a) becomes:
v=G(S)/G(K)

(5.5)

We shall refer to nG as the rate (i.e. the rapidity)

approximately.

of "equity orientation".

Since capital accumulation lies at the heart
.

15)

of growth, equation (5.5) shows that the rate of equity of orientation
(nG) is proportional to the capital growth rate (nk).

Hence for a fast

growing economy, the "equity" of capital ownership changes rapidly.
We shall refer to a positive (negative) value of nG as an "inequitable"
("equitable") orientation of capital ownership because the ownership of
capital stock become more unequally (equally) distributed through time.
Equation (5.5) shows:
(5.6)a)
b)

nG > 0

if and only if

v > 1 or

G(S) > G(K)

Thus growth with an inequitable orientation occurs when the
saving pattern Sis more unequally distributed than the pattern of

capital ownership K.

Thus (5.6b) is the necessary and sufficient

condition for a "conflict thesis" (i.e. growth with wealth concentration) provided condition

(5.3a) is satisfied (i.e. pro-

vided families that own more capital save more).

Hence the

differentiated family saving habits are the root cause of growth
with wealth concentration.
The fact that "families that own more capital save more"
(i~e. (5.3a)), in itself, does not imply the "conflict thesis".
A stronger condition on the differentiated saving habits between the
high and low capital owning families is needed.

Heuristically, let

us postulate a "Classical" savings function (see below) s==s(k)
relating the amount of family saving (s) to the amount of capital
16
stock (k) that the family owns >:
Definition:

The capital sensitive saving function s(k) is "Classical"
if it satisfies (Al) and (Cl).

Thus a classical s=s(k) implies two conditions being satisfied.
First of all, saving is non-negative.

Secondly, s/k increases with
When

k (i.e. increasing capital-sensitive average propensity to save)~

s(k) is postulated we have:
A

A

Lemma 5
(5. 7)

we have S=(S ..?!_2 , ••• s )=(s(K 1),s(K2), •••• s(K ))~n
1
if s(k) is a "classical" saving function
For Kfn

(Proof:

Lemma 3a implies that s(k) satisfies Bl.

Q.E.D.)

Thus with a classical saving function (5.3ab) are satisfi~d.
Furthermore we also have the following conclusion needed to complete
the conflict thesis due to the "strongly -differentiated" saving habits
implied by the .classical saving function.

Theorem 5 The classical saving function implies L(S)

~

L(K) for

every nonuniform Kfn
(Proof:

(5.7) shows that s(k) corresponds to a transformation

function with property Bl, Al and Cl.

The necessary condition

of theorem 2a completes the proof.)
Thus l(S) > l(K) for any reasonable index of inequality.
particular (5.6b) is satisfied.

In

Lemma 5 and theorem 5 imply the

followng corollary.
Corollary 4

Under a classical saving function

(5.8)

where v=G(S)/G(K) > 1
Thus we see that the classical saving function ensures growth has

inequitable orientation with a rapi~ity proportional tonk.

we know G(K') > G(K) in terms of Gini coefficient.

Thus

The following

theorem is a more general theorem that asserts I(K') > I(K) for any
reasonable index of inequality.
Theorem 6

The "classical saving .function" implies
for every non-uniform

L(K')

~

L(K)

K~n.

Notice theorem 6 implies the following corollary

17)

:

·Corollary 5 The Classical saving rule is a sufficient condition for
growth with an inequitable orientation in which

I(K')>l(K)
(Proof:

for any reasonable index of inequality.

by (1.5))

To prove theorem 6, let us refer to niss /K as the accumulation
1

rate and

1

oi•K /H (o cK /H') as the capital wealth share of the i-th
1

1 1

family in this (the next) period.

When K f

n,

the classical saving

rule implies:
(5.9)a)

We see
where·

{5.lO)a)

Since the national capital growt~ rate nkis the weighted average of
the family accumulatio n rates (ni in 5.10a), (5.9b) implies that the
families can be partiitoned into two classes (i.e. family groups),

L
H
a high class C and a low class C as follows:
CL=

(5. ll)a)

·{iln1 <nk}=(l,2, ••• p)

CH= {jjnj>nk}=( p+l, p+2, •••• n)

b)

Thus-the cumulation rate of any family in CL is strictly lower
H
than that of any family in C as it is lower than the national growth

rate (nk).

The "comparativ e" cumulation rate of the i-:-th family, Ei

is defined in (5.12b) below:
?
.... ... ,-,

1
.f ..
-

......

where

"

We have the following lemma:
Lemma 6

The "Classical" saving function implies that for CL and
CH defined in (5.11), ifCL

(5.13)a)

ni < nj

b)

ai ~ aj

c)

ai ~

ai

and

jfCH

imply

(j-=p+l, p+2, ••• n)

(5.13b) follows from

(Proof:

(5.13a) follows from (5.11 ).

(5.9a).

(5.13c) follows from (5.12) and (5.13a), namely

This theorem implies that the classical saving function has a
natural class-oriented interpretation such that the property share
and cumulation rate of every high class family is higher than those of

low class family.

Furthermore, (5.13c) implies that under the

classical rule there is a concentration of capital wealth in the upper
class families CH in the growth process.

Notice

(5.14)

H
L
and C and C are not empty (i.e. l~<n) when K is not uniform.
Condition (5.14) (5.10b) and (5.13c) and lemma 4 imply L(o)>L(o')
and hence L(K)~L(K').

This proves theorem 6.

Thus we see that the

classical saving rule-implies a "radical" conclusion of wealth concentration
in the growth process, with a class oriented consequence.

Conclusion.
The "radical" conclusion of "growth with capital weal_th concentrati on"
was based decisively on the "classical" saving function.

However.

whether or not the~"classi cal saving rule is valid is an empirical
question that can be verified statiscally .

Suppose s•s(z) in (1.4)

and n-=t(z) in (4.lb) are estimated statistical ly.

Then for ,isrk we

have
k=k{s.r):t{ s

(6.1)

-1

(s))/r

which is a functional relation between k (family held capital
stock) ands (family saving) taking r (the rate of return to capital)
as a parameter.

It is not "necessaril y true" that s/k is an increasing

function of k.
When the financial institution s (banks, stock markets etc.) are
primitive, it may be true that the vast majority of the workers (i.e.
those who receive only wage income) do not save because they can
not save without becoming entrepreneu rs and manage the capital assets
directly.

For such "under developed countries" it may be legitimate

to assume:
(6.2)a)

implies

Tl -=O

b)

implies

11i-=r

i

(the rate of return to capital)

One can readily shows that this is a "naive" classical saving
rule (i.e. workers with no property income do not save (6.2a) and
capital owner saves all property income (6.2b)) which is perhaps
what the "class oriented" classical writers of the 19th century had
in mind.

1-7)

In the contemporar y world,when it is possible for the

.

..

workers to acquire titles to capital assets through the inter-·
mediation of financial institutions, the classical saving rule should
not be an asserted one.

In the age of econometrics, the statistical

problem of (6.1) can be investigated with the aid of household survey
data after all.
Even when (6.1) is found to be "average increasing" empirically,
the pattern of capital ownership may not become more unequally dis
tributed through time for another reason, namely, the number of families
(n) will increase when population and labor force increase.IS)

The

spliting of the property of a deceased ''head of household" to
more than one heir

(i.e. new family starts) will obviously imply a

"counter concentration" tendency an,d with a more equal distribution of
property ownership.

Thus growth with or without concentration of

property ownership has other dimensions, the analysis of which is
beyond the scope of this paper.

Footnotes
(1)

See Kuznets [8], Adelman and Morris [l].

(2) ·. See World Bank Publications [2], and Paukert [10].
(3)

In the sense as defined by KuznP.ts[S].

(4)

See Schumpeter[ll], pp. 439

(5)

See Fei-Ranis-Kuo [3] and [4].

(6)

See Fei-Ranis-Kuo{4], chapter 3

(7)

A Keynes saving behavior is "income-sensitive" as postulated in
the well known saving function. The classical writers in the
19 century believes that saving is "capital sensitive". See
discussions in section 5 {See footnote 16).

(8)

See Fields[5]

.(9)

An index of the Dalton Family satisfies the axioms of transitivity,

symmetry, and rank preserving equalization. It is well known that
the familiar Gini coefficient, Atkinson index, Theil index and
coefficient of variation are reasonable indices. See Fields and
.
Fei 16).
(10) See Fields and Fei [ 6]
(11) A property pair (P 1 ,P ) is anti-symmetrical when "t(z) satisfies
2
Pi if and only if t*{z) satisfies the other property".
(12) Fei-Ranis-Kuo [3] postulated a property income function (4.lb)
in the lin~ar -fnrm -rr=l.+!>y !>nn -fn11nn t-h!>t" t-hP 11 rnTTP1;it-inn
characteristics" is quite high. They refer to property income as
"type one income"· as b < 0 and O <a< 1~ The readers should
check that Al, A2, B2 and Cl are satisfied when the income range
is properly restricted. Using this result they deduced the in
equalities of corollary 3** when the Gini coefficient is used.
(13) See Fei-Ranis-Kuo [4]~

''monotonic model" p. 365

(14) For example, the Ginj coefficient of income before tax is a
a weighted average of the Ginis of disposable income and tax
burden pattern.

(15)

This is true at least for contemporary less developed countries
in the early stage of development. For professor Kuznets[9]
bas pointed out that the epochal characteristic of modern
growth is technology change embodied in new capital formation.

(16)

The relation between the income sensitive saving function s(z)
in (1.4) and the capital sensitive saving function s(k)
postulated here will be discussed in (6.1) below.

(17)

(18)

See Schumpeter[ll], pp.641, for a discussion on the sources of
capital accumulation (e.g. "capital increases by revenue's
being converted into it") accoring to the "classic" schema of eco,.uomic growth. The fact that the working and capital-o'Wlling
classes have stror,gly differentiated saving habits was formulated
as a crucial behavior hypothesis in the growth model of
Kaldor[7].
Fei-Ranis-Kuo [4] found that the time series of the Gini co
efficients of property income are, in fact, falling for all·
households and for all urban households between 1964 and 1972
in Taiwan.

Appendix
Since lemma 4 is needed in the proof of theorem 2, we will prove lennna
4 and theorem 2 in sequence.
(1)

Proof of lemma 4:
and

1

ISi- s -si.

For i<k, we have

for all

•X.1.+CXi+l<O
Since on-o by (3.lb), then ok, ok+1 , ••• 15n
decreases to zero.
(2)

Thus ok>O and

o1>0 by

i>k

strictly monotonically

o1>0 for all i=l,2 •• ,n. Q.E.D.

Proof of the necessary condition of theorem 2a:
~

~

Let ZEn. then x~T(Z)in by lemma 2a and 3a. To complete the
proof given in the text, let X' be constructed as in (3.4a).
want to prove (3.6) by proving (3.lc).

We

Let the set of the first n

integers be partitioned into two subsets:

r-u r+

A.l)a)

(1,2,. ••• n)=

b)

r-•{ijXi<Xi};

c)

f -/\f+ a:_4> (null set)

r+•{ijXi>Xi}

We claim that both
A.2)a)
b)

r-,J

which imply

r- and r+ are not empty sets •. i.e.

4>

r+.; 4>
(3.lb) implies

r-,J:4>. Supposer+•4>.

the fact that Z is nonuniform and t(z) is progressive.
We claim that

Thus

r+,f.:4>.

iH- and j Er+

A.3)

ifr-

imply i < j

implies Xi/Zi <Xi/Zi=~x-xj/Zi<Xj/Zi(because j~r+)
A

Thus Xi/Zi<Xj/Zj.

We have i<j because Zfn

and t(z) satisfies

(Cl).
Let k be the largest integer of r-.

Then r--(1,2, ••• k) and

r+c(k+l,k+2, •••n) l<k<n. -Thus (3.lc) is proved.
(3)

Q.E.D.

Proof of the sufficient condition of theorem 2a:
To prove the sufficient condition of theorem 2a.

Suppose

A

L(T(Z))~L(Z) for all non-uniform Zfn.
real numbers ·satisfying
A.4)a)
b)

t(Z )>O
a-

O<Z
<Z...
- a -b

Let Za, Zb be any two

We want to prove

(i.e. to prove t(z) is non-negative) .

a:t{Za)/Za<t{~)/Zb=8

(i.e. to prove t(z) satisfies Cl)

The fact that L(T(U)) can be unambiguously defined implies
T(U}~O.

This proves A.4a.

To prove A.4b, we know that

For if t(Za)=t(Zb), then T(U) i~ a uniform
pattern and

L(T(U))>L(U)

is impossible.

t(z) is

thus either monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing.
Case 1:

for all Z ,Zb satisfying O<Z <Zb then t(Z )<t(Zb)
a
- a
a

Let Z

8

,

~

be any two real number satisfying 0<Z <~
8

Let the sum of all elements in U(T(U}} be denoted by s=Za+(n-l)Zb>O
(s t zt(Za }+(n-l}t(Z..
)>O).
-b

The normalization of U(T(U)) becomes

Ui.::(z:,zt,····Z~)=(l/s)(Za,~'-··~' (T(U)*={p,q, ••• q)=(l/st)(t(Za),
t(~), .... t(~)))

for case one, with z:+(n-l}~L-p+(n-l)q.

Lemma 4 can :be, applied.

>

Notice Z~ if and only if
a<

Thus either L(T(U)*)~L(U*) or L(T(U)*)<L(U*)

if Z"!/p.
a

Since we know L(U*)=L(U)>L(T(U))=L(T(U)*), so Z*=Z /s>p:t(Z )/st.
a
a

a

Hence Cl is proved
If t(Za )•O then t(Za )/Za <t(Zb)/2...
-b
If t(Z )>O, then Z /s>t(Z )/s can be written as
a

a

a

t

Q.E.D.
for all Za ,Zb satisfying O<Z
-b
-a<Zb then t(Za }>t{2..)

Case 2:

Since t(z) monotonically decreases and bounded from below by
zero, we know

x>¾·

lim t(z)=c

~

O.

If t{¾)=O then t(x)=O for all

z-+..,

The Lorenze curve for C¾,x,x, ••• x)=O can not be defined.

real numbers·O<Za <Zb, construct
For a pair of
.
the following vector with n components:

Thus t(¾)>O.

,Zb)fn
V=(Za ,za ,...z
a
·

with a sum sa(n-l)Z=+2..>0;
_ 7>

T(V)=(t(Z8 ),t(Z8 ) , ••• r(Z8 ),t(¾))>O which can be reordered to
Fx(t(Zb),t(Z 8 ) , ••••• t(Za))f0 with a sum st•t(¾)+(n-l)t(Z8 )>0

V and F can be normalized to become

,z , ...za ,Zb)
••• Z*,Zb*)={l/s)(Z
V"==(Z*,Z*,
a a
a
a a
F*={p,q, •••••• q)={l/s t ){t(Zb),t{Za ), ••• t(Za )) with (n-l)Z*+Z*=p+(n-l)q.
We have

~

-¾/s=l/(l+(n-l)(Z8 /Zb))

))
Z*a =Za /s=l/(n-l+(Z./Z
o a
p-t(Zb)/s •l/(l+(n-l){t(Z8 )/t(¾)))
q=t(Za)/st•l/(n-l+t(¾ )/t(Za))
For all sufficiently large Z8 Zb, the ratio t(Za)/t(Zb) is

arbitrarily close to one (by the Cauchy property).

Hence p

and q can be made arbitrarily close to 1/n (i.e. F* can be made
arbitrarily close to a uniform pattern (1/n,l/n, •• ~l/n)).
For a fixed Za we can choose~ sufficiently large to make

Za/¾ arbitrarily close to zero.

Thus

zt

(Z!) is made arbitrarily

close to 1 (0), and hence V* can be constructed to be arbi
trarily close to (0,0, ••• 1).
such that L(F*)~L(V*).

Thus we can construct V* and F*

However L(V)•L(V*)<L(F*)=L(F) =L(T(V).

This contradiction implies that case two is impossible. Q.E.D.
· {4)

Proofs of the necessary and sufficient condition of .theorem 2b
~re sudlar to those of theo~em 2a.
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